It has been over forty years since Edward Said’s Orientalism was published., but a shared understanding of ideas’ role in Middle East politics is often misdirected. There is an unwavering fascination for scholars, especially those in international relations, to see the Middle East as exceptional, often influenced by their ingrained Westfalian sensitivity. This perceived uniqueness is often attributed to many factors, such as a history of colonization, marked interference by foreign powers, a significant focus on oil production, limited state development, an unusual propensity for conflict, and, in particular, a common linguistic, religious, and cultural background. However, this approach, which is so focused on forming collective identities, lends itself only partially to explaining current developments.

During the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, efforts to establish collective security arrangements have historically been challenging to achieve. Lack of trust among regional states, differing views on threats, and conflicting national interests have all played a role in the unsuccessful attempts to establish a comprehensive security framework for the region. Russia, Iran and the United States have proposed to promote cooperation in the Gulf. However, these initiatives have struggled to gain significant support from Persian Gulf nations or the international community.

The need for economic security and resilience also drives minilateral diplomacy in the region. In the past decade, twelve of the sixteen agreements signed in the Middle East have focused on financial issues. The New Levant initiative, established by Egypt, Jordan and Iraq in March 2019, aimed to promote economic integration, but faced challenges. While countries have made great strides in connecting their power grids, other projects, such as the Basra-Aqaba oil pipeline, have been hampered by political and financial obstacles, security concerns, and interference from outside actors. These problems, budget constraints, and bureaucratic inefficiencies have slowed progress in implementing the initiative.

The minilateral agreements have struggled even in cases where security, fiscal capacity and government efficiency are minor obstacles to trade and investment. In 2021, India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States established I2U2 to promote high-quality, sustainable investments among partner countries. Despite ambitious announcements, such as the launch of a new joint venture in the space sector and the creation of the India-Middle East food corridor which involved $2 billion of Emirati investment in food parks in India, tangible results have not materialized. The delay in UAE investment in India’s agricultural sector is partly attributed to UAE concerns over India’s growing food protectionism, as The Essential Commodities Act grants Indian authorities greater flexibility in imposing export bans on agricultural products, thus posing a greater risk to investments in food parks.

The establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 can be linked to three significant events: the ouster of the Shah from Iran in 1979 by a broad ideological alliance quickly grasped by a revolutionary Islamic expansionist doctrine; the ensuing war between Iran and Iraq-two ambitious revolutionary regimes embroiled in a decades-long conflict; and the increased sense of importance and independence in foreign policy among the Gulf nations. partly attributed to oil manna. The emergence of the GCC was partly a reaction to the growing threat from post-revolution Iran, but also an effort to create a Gulf political alternative to the Arab League, at a time when the Gulf nations, buoyed by their improved fiscal capabilities, feared becoming the financiers of the region’s recovery after the upheavals, without being recognized as legitimate political actors.

Projects focused on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have demonstrated greater practicality than broader regional collaborations. The reason is that starting with a group of states with shared viewpoints minimizes complications that might arise in larger forums where consensus might be harder to achieve. With The political epicenter of the Middle East that has shifted to the Gulf over the past decade, focus on this subregion is in line with regional trends. The GCC platform has successfully incorporated states outside the subregion, such as Egypt and Jordan, which share common interests on certain issues. It has also proved helpful in realigning Iraq’s foreign policy with the mutual interests of its Arab neighbors. Moreover, Iran’s participation in a GCC+2 format is in line with its longstanding preference for regional dialogues that exclude outside powers such as the United States and Israel within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Rather than institutionally embodying specific social, cultural or religious norms, Gulf regionalism has mostly been driven by perceptions of insecurity, with institutional integration within the Arab Gulf seen as better protection than that offered by the main existing Arab regional organization, the Arab League.

Gulf regionalism, rather than being a reflection of specific social, cultural or religious norms, is predominantly influenced by perceptions of insecurity. This suggests that the integration of the Arab Gulf is considered a superior form of protection to the Arab League, the main existing Arab regional organization. This focus on security as a key factor in regionalism underscores the complex dynamics and priorities that drive the Gulf’s approach to integration and cooperation.

The establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) also indicates the intention of the Gulf nations to exercise their independence in foreign policy and position themselves as substantial political entities in the region. This transition from financial benefactors to political participants shows the changing priorities and incentives driving Gulf regionalism. As a result, the GCC has emerged as a crucial source of loyalty and normative structures for social and political activism within the region.

While the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has strived to establish itself as the main platform for defense policy in the Gulf region, it has faced challenges due to the bilateral extension of the U.S. security umbrella to the Gulf countries, rather than through regional cooperation. In contrast, some smaller Gulf nations, particularly Oman, have opposed the growing integration efforts led by Saudi Arabia following the Arab uprisings of 2011. This resistance is evident in initiatives such as King Abdullah’s proposal for a closer “Gulf Union” and the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal’s plan for an integrated regional military and security policy, both of which were presented to the GCC summits.

The uprisings in Bahrain and the eastern Saudi province. have not only caused concern in Riyadh, but also within the GCC. Iran’s perceived influence on Shiite populations in both countries initially led to greater unity between the monarchies, resulting in 2011 military intervention in Bahrain, l’invitation extended to the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies to join the GCC and The signing of the joint security agreement in November 2012 between the interior ministers of the GCC+2 (Jordan and Morocco). This agreement, supposedly aimed at combating terrorism, facilitated cross-regional cooperation among Sunni monarchies to suppress internal dissent. With the successes Ennahda’s initial election in Tunisia and of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the focus shifted from the security of the counterrevolutionary regime to a new concern. The potential insecurity of the regime was now influenced both by revolutionary social forces in the region and by the role of Islamist political actors who were benefiting from these post-revolutionary developments.

In June 2022, members of the Negev Forum met in Bahrain to lay the groundwork for future discussions and collaborations, agreeing to meet three times a year. Their first meeting in 2023 took place in Abu Dhabi, where they began planning a meeting in Morocco in March 2023, which was delayed twice due to political unrest over Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank. These meetings gained Track 2 support from the Atlantic Council and other organizations.

However, the Negev Forum faces several regional obstacles. Some Gulf states perceive the participants as having the shared goal of containing Iran’s expansionist aspirations, raising concerns about potential Iranian attacks on Gulf Arab nations. There is also a belief that the forum is overly exclusive and serves primarily to strengthen Israel’s regional integration, a move seen by many in the Middle East as detrimental to Palestinian peace. Without progress in the Palestinian peace process, achieving lasting regional cooperation and further normalization, including with Saudi Arabia, becomes increasingly difficult. These political obstacles could hinder the Negev Forum, reducing it to sporadic meetings and causing broader regional problems and tensions. Moreover, the fact that the United States is a signatory to the forum could limit its regional legitimacy and global appeal, as it could be perceived primarily as an American effort.

The Middle East and North Africa region has made progress in the search for regional stability. The rapprochement with Israel by some non-marginal actors marked a new phase of pragmatic politics that follows, in some respects, the embryonic phase of European cooperation: Jean Monnet himself declared that, in a forum with different sensitivities and backgrounds, dealing with technical matters between leaderships would be the best way to begin a supranational integrative process.

The parallels with European integration end there.
The Middle Eastern and North African region suffers from a participatory deficit
far wider than that experienced in Europe
, and leadership should take into account the moods and feelings of populations, which are delineated both on an ideal-cultural basis and in modern terms as class conflict.

The Abraham Agreements, launched in 2020 between Bahrain, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (later joined by Morocco and Sudan), as well as the 2022 Negev Forum, have manifested themselves as significant steps toward promoting peace and facilitating Israel’s regional integration. However,
agreements have run into obstacles because of the unfavorable attitudes of the Arab nations involved
, a problem likely exacerbated by Hamas’ assault on Israel in 2023. These challenges have prevented the creation of strong interpersonal connections as outlined in the agreement. The clash between Hamas and Israel has dispelled any illusions that Israel can pursue regional political and economic integration without addressing Palestinian issues.

The region has experienced profound unifying effects due to the transformative movements of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, blurring the often assumed demarcation between state and society in modern or pre-modern contexts.
Grasping the importance of ideologies requires understanding changes in state-society relations.
This understanding is critical to deciphering the rise and fall of specific ideological systems and their correlation with conceptual and material components. The spread of norms regionally and globally transcends mere interstate interactions. As a result, state actors should address public apprehensions to ensure both internal and external stability during a potentially crucial period.