This article was published in Analisi Difesa on November 15, 2024.

The modern political narrative has intensified in its dehumanization of opponents. Although portraying enemies has always been an aspect of conflicts, mainstream media now predominantly ignore alternative viewpoints, limiting our ability to grasp the motivations behind specific actions. This article is not apologetic toward Hezbollah. Instead, it aims to illuminate the group’s complex social influence. By understanding its popularity roots, we can explore how alternative welfare measures could address the problems of a large portion of Lebanese citizens without perpetuating popular support for Hezbollah.

The term “terrorist” is itself misleading, as it does not clarify the behaviours of those who oppose the observer. According to academia, there are over a hundred definitions of “terrorism.” History shows that terrorism falls within the realm of propaganda far more than political science; more often than not, revolutionaries or simply public dissent have been labelled according to the dominant narrative: if the Austro-Hungarian Empire had won World War I, Italian patriots who defected would probably have been called terrorists. To make matters worse, Libyan militias have gone even further into equivocal use of the terrorism argument: parts of the resistance movement against Qaddafi were affiliated with al-Qaeda in the pre-revolutionary phase but then suddenly became freedom fighters in Qaddafi’s ouster.

The ambiguity of the term “terrorist” leads to oversimplification of more complicated social issues. Therefore, it is crucial to analyze the material beliefs and needs of a group hostile to the West. While ideology and its instrumental use have been discussed extensively, this article strives to provide a clear picture of the material side of Hezbollah’s strategy to maintain widespread consensus.

In traditionally marginalized Shiite regions such as the Bekaa Valley, southern Lebanon, and parts of Beirut, Hezbollah has intervened to provide essential services such as health care, education, and security. This proactive role in crisis management, which exceeds that of any other political party, civil society organization and foreign aid initiative, is a testament to its commitment to the community.

Before the financial crisis hit in the fall of 2019, Hezbollah was already using its control over the Ministry of Health to partner with pharmacies in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. The goal was to provide its members and employees with drugs at reduced prices. However, many of these pharmacies faced challenges due to the Health Ministry’s inability to cover expenses and shortages of medicines caused by importers’ inability to access hard currency.

Hezbollah began acquiring financially struggling pharmacies, particularly in major cities such as Tyre and Nabatiyah, using U.S. dollars to deal with these problems. The group then flooded its pharmacies and health centers with Syrian and Iranian drugs smuggled across the border and through airports. This strategy allowed Hezbollah’s sellers to circumvent import taxes and cut off other traders. In doing so, Hezbollah could effectively pursue two goals: to continue profiting from Iranian drugs while maintaining its popular support.

Since the mid-2020s, the economic crisis has had an increasing impact on the Shiite population in areas where Hezbollah has established its resistance community: southern Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley. This impact is evident through shortages of essentials such as food, fuel, and medicines, complications within the banking system, and early indicators of rising crime and declining security.

These challenges pose significant hurdles for Hezbollah, which aims to create a parallel economy–called an economy of resistance–in its controlled regions. In response, Hezbollah has initiated several measures to help the Shiite community mitigate the negative effects of the economic recession. Iran strongly supports these initiatives, providing aid despite its severe financial difficulties. This helps develop Hezbollah’s military capabilities and manage the organization’s civilian initiatives within the Shiite community.

To cope with the shortage and soaring prices, Hezbollah has launched a chain of supermarkets called Al-Nour Depot in southern Lebanon, south Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. These stores offer Iranian and Syrian products at subsidized prices, about 30-50 percent less than the market. Customers can pay using a special shoppers’ card, the Al-Sajjad Card, named after the fourth Shiite imam, who stressed the importance of social solidarity. Recently, it has been reported that other stores outside the Hezbollah supermarket chain have also begun selling low-cost Iranian products.

In October 2019, Lebanese banks began restricting withdrawals of U.S. dollars and implementing informal capital controls. As a result, many account holders rushed to withdraw as much money as possible. Since then, Lebanese residents have withdrawn more than $6 billion from banks, which Hezbollah has sought to exploit by accessing this unofficial public reserve. The group has encouraged people to use its financial institutions for money exchange and deposits, mainly through al-Qard al-Hassan. This foundation, sanctioned by the United States, has become Hezbollah’s primary money exchange tool and a popular alternative banking option for its Shiite supporters.

Recently, al-Qard al-Hassan introduced ATMs in its branches in Beirut’s southern suburbs, allowing locals to receive cash payments and loans from Hezbollah without the same restrictions as traditional banks. The foundation is not classified as a bank or financial institution, so it does not receive funds from the Central Bank or any official state agency. This arrangement allows it to set its own rules and improve Hezbollah’s parallel economy. Looking ahead, Hezbollah hopes to restore access to hard currency, particularly the substantial deliveries of money from Tehran that have ceased due to sanctions. If successful, the group plans to position itself as the only entity in Lebanon with significant U.S. dollar reserves, effectively turning al-Qard al-Hassan into the country’s leading banking system.

Hezbollah’s social services are primarily focused on the Shiite community in Lebanon; however, there is evidence that non-Shiite communities also benefit from specific welfare programs.

Hezbollah has extended its social services beyond its traditional base by actively engaging with non-Shiite communities, particularly during times of crisis. In the early 1990s, the organization supported Christian families in Haret Hreik, helping them rebuild their homes and businesses after the civil war. Its health clinics serve individuals from diverse communities, focusing on quality and cost rather than religious affiliation. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Hezbollah demonstrated its inclusive approach by offering free medical testing and treatment and conducting educational campaigns on hygiene practices in areas like Sidon. The organization also assisted Syrian refugees, emphasizing its broader reach within the Lebanese population.

Hezbollah’s approach to the distribution of social services has undergone significant changes, especially since the Lebanese civil war. In the early 2000s, the organization expanded its social services to include individuals from various sectarian groups, which marked a shift from its predominantly Shiite support base. This strategic expansion addressed immediate social needs and served a political purpose, allowing Hezbollah to cultivate broader support among different communities. By integrating a broader population into its social service programs, Hezbollah effectively aligned its service delivery with its political goals to consolidate its influence and presence in Lebanese society.

Despite expanding its services, Hezbollah shows significant limitations in terms of non-Shia access to its offerings. Shiite Lebanese have priority within the organization’s social service institutions, which often results in less attention for non-Shiites. In addition, many of these institutions are located in predominantly Shiite areas, creating additional barriers for non-Shiite individuals seeking assistance.

While Hezbollah has made efforts to extend its social services to non-Shiite communities, the benefits to these groups are still generally less extensive than those offered to the core Shiite electorate. However, this expansion is part of a broader strategy to gain political support and recognition throughout Lebanese society.

Israel’s recent operations have made it nearly impossible to send Iranian aid, thus reducing the known abundance of primary and complementary goods available to Hezbollah’s welfare sectors. Although Beirut International Airport is under Hezbollah’s control, Iran has refrained from challenging Israeli air superiority in the region to avoid further losses and pave the way for further escalation.

The ongoing conflict has resulted in significant infrastructure destruction and widespread displacement in Lebanon, severely impacting Hezbollah operations and the civilian population. The Israeli army’s attack on nearly 30 offices associated with al-Qard al-Hassan, a Hezbollah-linked financial institution, disrupted crucial financial services essential to Lebanese civilians. By the end of June 2024, some 97,000 people had been displaced from southern Lebanon, a figure that rose to more than 1 million by the end of October 2024 due to incessant shelling. This large-scale displacement, coupled with the loss of financial resources, has overwhelmed Hezbollah’s welfare systems, hampering its ability to provide needed aid and support to those affected.

The recent conflict has greatly affected Hezbollah’s standing among the Lebanese population, as evidenced by the 2024 Arab Barometer survey, showing that support for Hezbollah remains relatively low. The repercussions of the Israeli offensive are likely to pose long-term challenges, including the destruction of vital financial infrastructure, disruption of the economy, and damage to healthcare and other essential services. These factors, combined with large-scale displacements, will complicate Hezbollah’s efforts to sustain its extensive welfare system in the years ahead.

The Israeli bombing campaign in 2024 has profoundly affected the perception of non-Shiite communities in Lebanon toward Israel and Hezbollah. A significant majority of Lebanese, regardless of community affiliation, widely condemn Israeli actions, with 78 per cent considering the Gaza bombing an act of terrorism. Despite sectarian tensions exacerbated by Israel’s attempts to incite division among Lebanese, communities-particularly in targeting Shiite areas-there is a growing sense of unity against Israeli aggression. Civil society initiatives have emerged, bringing together volunteers from various sects to support displaced families, further illustrating how the conflict promotes solidarity in a context of fear and upheaval. However, as the situation evolves, non-Shiite communities find themselves navigating between complex feelings toward both Israel and Hezbollah, weighing their condemnation of Israeli actions against their concerns about the implications of Hezbollah’s involvement.

Israel’s actions in Lebanon can be seen as a tactical success, although they raise questions in terms of strategic value and political articulation. The country implemented effective strategies based on lessons learned in the 2006 conflict. Hezbollah seemed unprepared for a conflict that relied on intelligence and cyber dominance rather than pure military power. This led to a significant difference in both sides’ approaches, reflecting contrasting eras of military conflict. Strategically, Israel challenged the rhetoric of the Axis of Resistance, effectively undermining many of its allies with decisive actions and discrediting Iran’s role as a credible protector.